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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3900 
_____________ 
 
CYNTHIA M. HWANG, ESQ., 
 
                        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 TOWNSHIP OF HILLSBOROUGH;  
 TOWNSHIP OF BRIDGEWATER 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-15-cv-02685) 
District Judge: Hon. Peter G. Sheridan 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: February 15, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Cynthia Hwang appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her 
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  On appeal, Hwang argues that the District Court erred in 
holding that she did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial on criminal charges that 
New Jersey law treats as “petty offenses.”  Because the District Court correctly 
concluded that Hwang’s argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, we will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint.1 
I. 
 Hwang brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the New Jersey 
Townships of Hillsborough and Bridgewater as a result of an arrest that occurred in 
Hillsborough in October of 2012, and a subsequent criminal trial that occurred in the 
Bridgewater Municipal Court in June of 2013.  Hwang alleges that she “was charged with 
refusal to provide breath sample, DUI, failure to maintain lane, resisting arrest, and 
cracked windshield.”  (Complaint ¶ 25.)   Hwang does not contend that any of these 
offenses carried a prison term of more than 6 months or a fine of more than $1,000.  She 
was convicted of each of the charged offenses following a nonjury trial.2  Although 
Hwang’s Complaint raised a number of claims arising out of her arrest and conviction, 
                                              
 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  Nami v. Fauver, 82 
F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).  Because we write primarily for the parties, our discussion of 
the facts is limited to those most relevant to this appeal.  
 
2 The record before us does not include the punishment imposed.  Nor does the 
record disclose whether Hwang appealed the convictions in the New Jersey State Courts.    
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her appeal is limited to the question of whether she had a constitutional right to a trial by 
jury on the charges against her.  
 The Sixth Amendment, in pertinent part, provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[] by an impartial jury of the  
State . . . wherein the crime shall have been committed.”  The states are bound by the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee through its incorporation into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).  
But despite the broad pronouncement that the accused in “all criminal prosecutions” has 
the right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court in Duncan observed that “[i]t is doubtless true 
that there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment 
jury trial requirement here applied to the States.”  Id. at 159 (footnote omitted).3  The 
Supreme Court further explained the reasons for this exclusion.  Historically, “petty 
offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always 
been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial provisions.”  Id. at 160.  Practically, “the possible consequences 
to defendants from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to 
                                              
 3 See also S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351 (2012) (stating that 
insubstantial fines and “offenses punishable by relatively brief terms of imprisonment . . . 
do not entitle a defendant to a jury trial”); Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 
541 (1989) (“It has long been settled that ‘there is a category of petty crimes or offenses 
which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision.’”); District of Columbia 
v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937) (“It is settled by the decisions of this Court . . . that 
the right of trial by jury . . . does not extend to every criminal proceeding.”) 
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outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration 
resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications.”  Id.  In 
Duncan, the Court concluded that “[c]rimes carrying possible penalties up to six months 
do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses.”  Id. at 159. 
 In Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 326 (1996), the Court reaffirmed that 
“[a]n offense carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less is presumed petty, 
unless the legislature has authorized additional statutory penalties so severe as to indicate 
that the legislature considered the offense serious.”  The Court in Lewis addressed an 
issue raised by Hwang: whether there is a right to trial by jury when the accused is 
charged with several petty offenses so that the punishment in the aggregate could exceed 
six months’ imprisonment.  The Court answered this question in the negative, stating that 
“[w]here the offenses charged are petty, and the deprivation of liberty exceeds six months 
only as a result of the aggregation of charges, the jury trial right does not apply.”  Id. at 
330.  
 Here, Hwang does not argue that any of the crimes with which she was charged 
carried a potential prison term of more than six months.  Nor does Hwang dispute the fact 
that under New Jersey law, the crimes with which she was charged are classified as 
“petty disorderly persons offenses” or “disorderly persons offenses,” and that the New 
Jersey legislature has decreed that “[t]here shall be no right . . . to trial by jury on such 
offenses.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4.  Instead, Hwang asserts that “the petty offense 
doctrine is an unjustified departure from both the letter and underlying philosophy of the 
Constitution,” and she asks that we “abandon dubious Sixth Amendment precedents in 
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favor of more principled jurisprudence.”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9.)  In making this 
argument, Hwang tacitly concedes that governing Supreme Court precedents, including 
Duncan and Lewis, have resolved this issue in a way adverse to her position.  “Supreme 
Court decisions are binding precedent in every circuit.”  United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 
163, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  Accordingly, the District Court correctly rejected 
Hwang’s challenge to the petty offense doctrine.4   
II. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s November 20, 2015 order 
dismissing Hwang’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 
                                              
 4 Because we affirm the District Court’s decision to dismiss Hwang’s complaint 
on this ground, we need not address Appellee Township of Hillsborough’s argument that 
Hwang’s claims were untimely.  
